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INFANTS' CONTRACTUAL DISABILITIES:
DO MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
TRENDS DEMAND A CHANGE IN THE LAW?
Contractual responsibility and disability of infants is one of the oldest and most firmly entrenched areas of the law.' It is well known that
infants' contracts are voidable and can be disaffirmed either during minority or after becoming an adult.2 Executed and executory contracts
are both subject to this rule permitting infant disaffirmance,8 the chief
exception being a contract for "necessaries" for which an infant must
pay a reasonable value in quasi-contract upon disaffirmance.4 The only
other exceptions to the rule permitting disaffirmance are statutory,5 or
involve contracts which deal with duties imposed by law such as a "contract of marriage" (but not a contract to marry), or an agreement to
provide for an illegitimate child.'
Since the fifteenth century the law of infants' contractual responsibility has been virtually stagnant.! This note will examine the reasons
for the establishment of the age of majority at twenty-one,' determine if
this age was and is still a valid criterion for granting full contractual capacity, and explore possible solutions to the problems 9 created in modern
society by reason of the present posture of the law of infants' contractual
responsibility. A judgment on the merits of any solutions must include
a consideration of relevant social interests which are frequently in conflict. Society has a moral obligation to protect the interests of infants
1. 2 WiLIsTON, CONTRACTS § 223 (3d ed. 1959).
2. Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N.E. 420 (1886) ; Wooldridge v. Hill, 124 Ind.
App. 11, 114 N.E.2d 646 (1953); Shroyer v. Pittenger, 31 Ind. App. 158, 67 N.E. 475
(1903). See generally, 2 WiLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 235, 238.
3. Ibid.
4. Ayers v. Burns, 87 Ind. 245 (1882); 2 WnIsToN, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 240,

241.

5. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2005 (Burns 1964) (excepting minor's checks
from disaffirmance); IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-5174 (Burns 1964 Supp.) (binding minors
on their educational loans); IND. ANN. STAT. § 59-1017 (Burns 1961) (providing that
minor veterans and their spouses may not disaffirm loans made in ptlrsuance of G.I.
loan program). This piecemeal legislation indicates a recognition that exceptions are
needed to the common law rules of infants' contracts.
6. 2 WLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1, § 228. The common law of England also excepted the king, mayors, dukes, and earls: 6 BACON'S ABRIGMENT 104 (1876).
7. 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1.
8. One might guess that the figure twenty-one was arrived at by multiplying the
magic numbers seven and three; however, the textual discussion seems to refute this.
Why twenty-one was chosen over, say, nineteen, may well have had a purely superstitious
base.
9. For several problems not treated in the discussion, see text accompanying note
11 infra.
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from overreaching adults. But this protection must not become a straight
jacket, stifling the economic and social advancement of infants who have
the need and maturity to contract."0 Nor should infants be allowed to
turn that protective legal shield into a weapon to wield against fair-dealing adults.'
It is in the interest of society to have its members contribute actively to the general economic and social welfare, if this can be
accomplished consistently with the protection of those members unable
to protect themselves in the market place.
There are two troublesome areas of the law of infants' contracts
which are not within the scope of this discussion. First, courts have
tended to adhere to precedent more than the realities of modern society
in determining the constituents of the class labeled "necessaries." By
way of illustration, no reported case has held an automobile to be a
"necessary." In one case' 2 the court stated that the automobile is a
"common necessity for the average workingman,"" but refused to hold
it a "necessary" to the minor at bar (who was emancipated, working,
about to be married, and living hundreds of miles f)'om his family). It
is submitted that realistic evaluation is needed in thi. area. However, as
this discussion is an attempt to find practical solutiors to the problems of
infants who want and need to contract, and sincc any change in the
definition of "necessaries" would do little to increase the over-all ability
of an infant to find adults willing to contract with him, 4 extensive treatment of the "necessaries" problem is here omitted.
The second problem area which is without the scope of this note is
misrepresentation of age by an infant to obtain coatractual advantage.
10.

"laturity" in this context means the ability to under;tand and appreciate the

ramifications of a potential contract with an adult, i.e., the possession of reasoning power
and judgment.
11. For example, when a minor misrepresents his age to :tn adult dealing in good
faith with him and later disaffirms the contract, the law should not give him its protection.
12. Bowling v. Sperry, 133 Ind. App. 692, 184 N.E.2d 901 (1962). Also see, Perry
Auto Co. v. Mainland, 229 Iowa 187, 294 N.W. 281 (1940); Chambers v. Dunmeyer
Chevrolet Co., 74 Ohio App. 235, 58 N.E.2d 239 (1942). But cf. Ehrsam v. Borgen, 185
Kan. 776, 347 P.2d 260 (1959), in which the minor defendant ws the driver of an automobile in which plaintiff was injured. To enable him to plead the Kansas guest statute
as a defense the minor attempted to disaffirm a "share the ride' agreement. The court
held that "private transportation for the worker is now a necessity, and an agreement
made by a minor for such transportation is . . . not subject t( disaffirmance." Id. at
779, 347 P.2d at 264.
13. Bowling v. Sperry, 133 Ind. App. 692, 698, 184 N.E.2d 901, 904 (1962).
14. It is doubtful that a car dealer, for example, would wz nt to take a chance that
a court would hold that an automobile sold to a particular mn)r was a "necessary" to
him. In fact, it is doubtful whether the dealer would want to risk becoming involved in
a suit at all, even if there were a high probability that the automobile sold would be held

a "necessary."
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This particular fraud is surprisingly prevalent in the reported cases"r and
jurisdictions have worked out various solutions to protect the adult.
These solutions are usually based either on estoppel of the infant to plead
his non-age or on a subsequent action by the adult in tort for deceit.'"
Although misrepresentation of age presents serious practical and theoreticaF problems, it is unrelated to socio-economic changes in society and
therefore will not be discussed.
WHO IS AN INFANT, AND WHY?

An infant at common law, and in most jurisdictions today, is any
person under the age of twenty-one years.'8 It is generally assumed that
the infant is protected by the law because it is presumed that all persons
under the age of twenty-one years are incapable, due to their immaturity,
of obtaining fair treatment at the hands of an adult.' Although that
15. One of the more recent examples is Mitchell v. Campbell and Fetter Bank,
Ind. App. -, 195 N.E.2d 489 (1964). See also cases cited inrfra note 16.
16. An early view, expressed in Sims v. Everheart, 102 U.S. 300, 313 (1880), was
that misrepresentation of age was immaterial: "A conveyance by a minor is an assertion
of his right to convey. A contemporaneous declaration of his right or age adds nothing
to what is implied in his deed."
The following states allow an action against the minor in deceit: Colorado,
(Doeunges-Long Motors, Inc. v. Gillen, 138 Colo. 31, 328 P.2d 1077 (1958)); Illinois,
(Davidson v. Young, 38 Ill. 145 (1865)) ; Indiana, (Carpender v. Carpender, 45 Ind. 142
(1873)) ; South Carolina, (Beem v. McBrayer, 132 S.C. 72, 128 S.E. 34 (1925)) ; Wisconsin, (Wisconsin Loan & Finance Co. v. Goodnaugh, 201 Wis. 101, 228 N.W. 484
(1930)).
The following grant estoppel of the minor to plead infancy when he has misrepresented his age: Florida, (Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Perlman, 47 So. 2d 296 (Fla.
1950)); Georgia, (Carney v. Southland Loan Co., 92 Ga. App. 559, 88 S.E.2d 805
(1955)); Kentucky, (Pinnacle Motors v. Daugherty, 231 Ky. 626, 21 S.W.2d 1001
(1929)) ; Mississippi, (Johnson v. McAdroy, 228 Miss. 453, 88 So. 2d 106 (1956)) ; Missouri, (Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. App. 1960) ) ; Montana, (Downey v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 72 Mont. 166, 232 P. 531 (1924)); New Jersey, (Reggiori v.
Forbes, 128 N.J.L. 391, 26 A.2d 145 (1942)) ; Tennessee, (Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192,
17 S.W.2d 8 (1929)) ; Texas, (Evans v. Henry, 230 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)).
A few states grant neither remedy to the adult. See, e.g., Greensburo Morris Plan
v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923); Summit Auto Co. v. Jenkins, 20 Ohio
App. 229, 153 N.E. 153 (1925).
Four states have identical statutes which prohibit disaffirmance by the misrepresenting minor: IowA CODE ANN. § 599.3 (1950) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-103 (1964) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 15-2-3 (1953) ; REV. CODE OF WAsH. ANN. § 26-28-040 (1961). There are

also many statutes which remove the ability to disaffirm when the minor misrepresents
his age in connection with certain contracts. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 18-2006, 183127, and 18-2248 (Burns 1964), which deal with loans from banks and trust companies,
industrial loan companies, and credit unions, respectively.
17. For example, if the minor is estopped to assert his non-age the full contract
price is collectible by the adult regardless of whether the adult has overreached;
there is no "reasonable-value" rule such as protects the minor who buys necessaries. If
the adult is permitted an action in deceit, it would seem that he is merely enforcing the
contract by indirect means when he is not permitted to do so directly, despite assertion
to the contrary in the cases.
18. 2 WILLIST N, op. cit. supra note 1, § 224.
19. 15 VER IER, AMERICAN FA MLY LAWS § 280 (1938).
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presumption may be the reason for the continuance of infants' disabilities,
it was not the sole reason for their establishment.
Infants' contractual disabilities have been 1:nown since Roman
times."0 In Rome, the rationale was based on the immaturity of the infant, the test of maturity being: does he have both understanding and
judgment as to acts in law, particularly in relation to property rights?
The minor was presumed to have this judgment and understanding at age
fourteen.2 ' This same age was adopted among the barbarians of Europe,
where the rationale was, however, not maturity but the ability to bear
arms. 22 In England, before the Magna Carta, the age of majority was
probably fifteen ;23 however, by that time the age for the upper classes had
been raised to twenty-one. There is evidence that this raising of the
age was due not to a decrease in the maturity level cf the youths of England, but to an increase in the weight of arms and armor and increased
training necessary to use improved implements of war.2" One of the
prime duties of a youth on coming of age was military service for his
lord, and after the development of heavy chain mail, a callow fifteenyear-old did not have the strength required of a k-night.2 5 In addition,
the battles were being fought with greater frequenc3 on horseback, which
also required additional strength and training. That the increased
strength required of a youth was a cause in the raising of the age to
twenty-one is further illustrated by the fact that a ward in socage, a tenure
generally unrelated to military duties, came of age at fifteen. 6 When
the military tenures were abolished in 1660, the age of twenty-one, having
been used by the higher class lords and knights, was generally accepted by
the other classes and the common law.
Therefore it seems that the age of twenty-one, which most American
jurisdictions accept as the age of contractual capacity, was not based entirely on the maturation of youth, but largely on the practical military
needs of the society in which youth lived. Indeed, it may be that from
the standpoint of maturity the age of twenty-one was never a valid age
for the fixing of capacity. Even if twenty-one were once a valid age to
grant contractual capacity, it may be that the retention of that age in the
1960's is arbitrary and based only on long establishA tradition.
20.

James, The Age of Maijority, 4 AMER. J. OF LEGAL His. 22 (1960).

21.

Full capacity, however, did not come until twenty-fiv , years of age. 2 SHERLAW IN THE MODERN WORLD § 406 (3d ed. 1937).
22. James, op. cit. supra note 20, at 25.
23. Ibid.
24. James, op. cit. supra note 20, at 24.
25. 5 BACON's ABRIDGMENT 101 (1876).
26. Co. Lirr. 45b (19th ed. 1853). Gavelkind lands could be alienated at fifteen:
Co. Lirt. 171b n. 5 (19th ed. 1853); 5 BACON's ABRIDGMENT 102 (1876).
MuAN, ROMAXN
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MATURITY OF YOUTH IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY

To determine the validity of retaining twenty-one years as the age of
majority, one may look both to comparative statistics-from which certain conclusions may be drawn-and to the few available comparative sociological studies of maturity." In the statistical area, the most obvious
change in society is the remarkable increase in the population of urban
areas over rural in the past 150 years.2" This population increase in the
urban centers has been accompanied by a change in the modes of living :2
whereas the young man in a rural area could gain business experience at
an early age by helping his father with the management of the family
farm, the modem city youth gains little such experience. Business life in
the city is likely to be miles from the place of residence, and is a life into
which the family of the breadwinner does not often enter. Because of
his greater opportunity for business experience, the rural infant of the
past may have been more knowledgeable and mature in contractual matters than the infant of today. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the economy of this century is vastly more complex than in the past.
It takes much more time and study to be even reasonably competent to
participate in modem business than it did in the eighteenth century. The
magnitude of the most common modem business transaction is greater
than all but the most infrequent of transactions of several centuries ago;
nothing then could compare with the purchase of an automobile, a major
appliance or a house full of furniture, except perhaps the purchase of
land or a slave. Furthermore, the modem minor spends more time in attaining a formal education than did his counterpart of even three decades
ago." He is thus isolated from the commercial world to a greater degree
than if he were earning a living, and is likely to be less sophisticated in the
27. This would be an excellent field into which sociologists might venture. There
are a number of studies which reach the rather obvious conclusion that maturity varies
among individuals, and which give excellent criteria for determining the maturity of a
given person, but few which examine maturity as related to age of youth today compared with the youth of bygone generations. See, e.g., SAUL, EXOTIoNAL MATURIrY

(1960).
28. Whereas in 1790, 94.9% of the population of the United States lived in rural
areas, by 1960 this figure had decreased to 30.1%. 1960 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION,
vol. 1, part A, table 3.
29. STORCK, MAN AND CIVILIZATION 333 (1927).
30. In 1930, there were 1,101,000 students attending 1,409 institutions of higher
learning. In 1960, this had increased to 3,216,000 students in 2,037 such institutions. 1964
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 107. This represents an increase from
11% to 33% of the total number of youths of college age (18-21), which total remained
relatively constant at nine million. 1960 CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 28, table 157. In
1870, only 1.7% of the population aged 18 to 21 attended college. HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 211, ser. H-322.
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ways of contract and business." Therefore, from the standpoint of the
maturity of today's youth, the age of twenty-one might be too low an
age to grant contractual capacity.
The few relevant sociological studies available point to the same
conclusion: while the infant of today has more formal education than his
grandfather, he probably has a lower level of maturity and sophistication
than the former generations."2 Modern studies have shown that the average minor in his late teens is still very much in the developmental state of
memory, judgment, reasoning, comprehension, invention, direction, and
criticism. This development goes on at least into the early twenties.3
An argument can thus be made that on the b,-sis of the data presented above, the age of contractual capacity should be retained or even
raised. This assumes, however, that maturity is the sole and deciding
factor to consider in arriving at an age at which contractual capacity
should begin.
There are several other factors which should ,nter into the determination of the proper age at which to begin contractual capacity, and
after examining them, one might arrive at the conclusion that a fixed age
is not the most appropriate method, at least as the sole determinate of
capacity. Its main advantage may lie in the simplicity of administration
provided by an arbitrary standard.3 '
An interesting change has taken place in the commercial law relevant
to this inquiry. In the years immediately after the formation of the basic
concepts of the common law infants' disabilities doctrine, the harsh rule
of caveat emptor prevailed. Parties to a contract we!re left to determine
for themselves the fairness and desirability of their contracts within very
wide limits. In such a situation, it is clear that any large group which
lacked understanding of the ways of contract would need the protection
of the law; one such group was infants. Extensive change has occurred
31. Although, as pointed out infra in text at note 42, today's minors spend more
money than ever before, it is submitted that evidence of increa ;ed purchases is not evidence of increased commercial sense.

32. COLE, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 195, 459
ADOLESCENT COURT AND CRIME PREVENTION 26 (1938).

(1936); BRILL

AND PAYNE,

THE

33. Brooks, Intellectual Development from Fifteen to Twenty-two, in GROWTH
ALD DDVELOPMENT: THE B.\sls FOR EDUCATIONAL PROaRASS 0939). The same author
indicates that several generations ago, it was thought that this :-rowth reached a saturation point in the early teens, with no growth thereafter. Indeed, the average adult in
this countr, was thought to have a mental age between thirte~a and fourteen years; a
belief accepted by reputable psychologists and educators. It is interesting that the law
of infants' contracts was not changed during the period that this belief was widespread.
34. Note the emphasis on the word "sole." If valid relationships can be found between capacity-in-fact and age for a significant number of infaits, there is no objection

to using age as a partial criterion for capacity. See text accornpanying notes 58 and 63
infra.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in this century. In the Uniform Commercial Code, the buyer of goods,
at least, has been given extensive protection from bad bargains, both in
the extension of warranties8 5 and the power of the courts to void "unconscionable contracts or clauses." 88 Stated in oversimplified terms, the
law seems to be adopting the view that no one in this complex modern
society, adults or minors, should be left completely alone to risk the fairness of the bargain into which he enters.8 7 Do minors, then, need the
special protection which the law still provides, in the light of present day
protection given to all consumers? The apparent purpose of denying capacity to minors is to protect them from unfair contracts; if the law provides remedies to the public generally from such contracts, it is at least
arguable that the refuge of incapacity is no longer necessary for the protection of the infant. This assertion may be valid several decades hence.
At present, though, the laws protecting the public from unscrupulous
dealings are still in infancy themselves; it is doubtful that they have yet
developed enough to cure all the problems presented in the field of infants' contracts.8" On the other hand, these laws may present an argument for the reduction of contractual age in certain cases where the protection required does not need to be as extensive as the complete withholding of contractual capacity.
Two final factors to consider in arriving at an age to begin contractual capacity are the infant's need to contract and the need of society to
allow him to contract. On the latter point, recent surveys89 show that today's minors spend annually more than twelve billion dollars, and a sizable portion of this is on credit in the form of department store charge
accounts. The business community obviously feels that the risk of dis35. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-312-2-318 (1963).
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1963).
37. Even the tort law has begun to recognize this; see case annotations for RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395 (1965).
38. The increasing protection given by the law against unfair or one-sided bargains

seems to be confined largely to the area of sales. Even in this area, it has been suggested
that the unconscionable contract section of the U.C.C. is but a statutory expression of
the existing prejudice among judges and juries against unfair bargains, and thus not a

drastic assault on the citadel of freedom of contract. Bun, Freedom of Contract Under
the Uniform Coinmercial Code, 2 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REv. 59, 65 (1960). If this
view is correct, it represents little improvement over the test expressed in Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889), that to be voided because of unconscionability
at law, a contract had to be one that "no man in his sense and not under a delusion would
make on the one hand, and no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Compare
1 ComIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1951).
There is a considerable difference in the policy behind the protection of consumers
and the protection of minors. Infants should be protected from any bargain which is not
to their advantage while the protection afforded consumers in general may be no more
than seeing that the contract does not work a definite disadvantage on them.
39. One of which was reported in Time Magazine, January 29, 1965, pp. 56, 57a.
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affirmance is more than offset by the advantages to it and to the economy in allowing these sales.4" One can only speculate on the additional
amounts of money which would be put into the economy if all, or some,
barriers to capacity were removed. Minors have more money to spend
than ever before, and they are spending it in great volume on small items
despite the restrictions 1 placed on their contractual capacity. Perhaps
some method could be devised that would benefit the economy, bring the
law into harmony with business practice, and make it easier for mature
minors to make major purchases. Perhaps, with the increase in spending
by today's youth, eventually there will be problems of disaffirmance, with
a consequent rash of litigation. It would be desirable if this can be foreseen and possibly prevented by providing a means whereby a minor's need
to contract could be satisfied.
In an examination of the need of certain minors to contract, one
class of minor comes immediately to mind: the cmancipated minor.4 2
There is no distinction43 in the law of contract between an emancipated
minor and one who is not emancipated. Undeniably, the laws designed to
protect infants in general completely hamstring the emancipated infant.
To illustrate, the married minor who has need to make any major purchase finds that he cannot do so unless he pays cash," and the rule binding
40. Perhaps the majority of businessmen do not realize tl-at even small cash sales
can be disaf firmed in most states.
41. "Restrictions" is a proper term, because the protection given infants by the law
is a many edged sword: the infant who desires and needs a contract will have difficulty
finding an adult who is willing to deal with him. The adult, of course, fears disaffirmance.
42. Emancipation may be made by express agreement between child and parent, or
by implication, as when the child marries. See generally, 2 \VILLISToN, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 225.
43. A distinction of sorts is made in the "necessaries" area. The number of possible items which might be held "necessaries" is increased somewhat to include items essential to the fulfilling of the infant's role as husband and father. Burns v. Smith, 29
Ind. 181, 64 N.E. 94 (1902) ; Taunton v. Plymouth, 15 fass. 203 (1818).
44. The fallacy of this is apparent when one observes tha- a minor may disaffirm
even an executed contract. See cases cited note 3 supra. An informal survey by the
author in Bloomington, Indiana, a small Midwestern college community, indicated that
any charge account opened by a minor at the local stores mut be guaranteed by the
minor's parent or guardian. The credit manager of a large na.tional chain-store, however, said that if the applicant had good credit and a steady job that his age was immaterial to them. That is, they are more interested in stability than age. An exception
to the merchants who would sell for cash was the automobile dealer. None contacted
would sell to minors under any conditions, unless their pareni.s signed agreements to
guarantee the purchase price and save the dealer harmless from any liability he might
incur as a result of the sale. This policy may be due both to the fear of disaffirmance
and to an Indiana decision which held a vendor of an automobile liable for a tort committed by the vendee with the automobile: Smith v. Thomas. 126 Ind. App. 59, 130
N.E.2d 85 (1955), in which the court said, "where a person torns over an automobile
to be driven . . .on the public highways of this state to a person who is too young to
obtain a drivers license with (sic) restrictions . . . he is liable for negligence in the
entrusting the operation of the automobile to such minor for any damages for injuries
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him quasi-contractually for necessaries does not always furnish a solution. Of course, he may obtain a surety4 5 or have a guardian appointed,
or his father or other adult may make the purchase in the adult's name.
These remedies are circuitous, troublesome, and often impractical. The
doctrine of infants' incapacities has always obstructed the emancipated
infant in his personal and business dealings. However, in this decade
there are enough emancipated infants in the United States to justify the
law's special recognition of their peculiar problems.
In the present century alone, the married infant has risen from relative obscurity to a numerically prominent position: almost one-half million males4" in this country aged eighteen, nineteen, and twenty are married.4" Of the twenty year-old males, almost one fourth of the total are
married.
Compare this to figures of only forty years ago, when a mere
189,000 males in the same three-year age group and only one-half the
present percentage of the twenty year-olds were married.49 This large
and growing group of minors have the same legal responsibilities and
duties as adults towards their spouse and offspring, but are treated as any
other minor by the law of contract."0 These married infants live like
adults, often, free from parental restrictions; however, to the law of contract they are no different than any other infant.
It is common knowledge that our economy is increasingly based on
caused as a result of the negligence of such minor." But cf., Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450,
195 N.E. 81 (1935); Ingram's Adm'r. v. Advance Motor Co., 283 Ky. 87, 140 S.W.2d
840 (1940) ; Rush v. Smitherman, 294 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
45. While a surety provides a great deal of protection to the merchant, the device
is not foolproof. Although the adult surety is not discharged from liability if the infant
disaf firms the contract (Gnaggs v. Green, 48 Wis. 601, 4 N.W. 760 (1880)), if the minor
both disaffirms and returns the consideration furnished him, the contract is at an end,
and the surety is released from further liability. Evants v. Taylor, 18 N.M. 371, 137 P.
583 (1913).
46. Females are excluded from these figures for the following reasons: (1) Most
states have made provision for validating any contracts made jointly by a minor wife and
her adult husband. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-203, 56-204 and 56-207. (2) Far
more females in the age groups presented are married than males. Thus their inclusion
would inflate the figures, and since the additional married females must be married to
adult males, and the statutes above mentioned take care of their problems, the inflation
of the figures would indicate a need even greater than it is. (3) In most instances, if
the husband is given the capacity to contract it will be sufficient to solve the problems
raised in this paper, therefore a truer picture of the need of the married minor may be
presented by reference only to the statistics for males.
47. 1960 CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 28, table 179.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. At the beginning of this century, only 1% of the fifteen to nineteen year
olds were married (the marital status of the 735,649 males aged twenty is not available).

TWELFTH CENSUS

OF THE

UNITED

STATES,

vol. II, part II, tables XLIV and XLVIII

(1900). It is interesting that in Indiana 27.4% of the twenty-year old males are married: considerably above the national figure. 1960 CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 28, pt. 16,
table 105.
50. See note 43 supra.
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credit, yet the law denies nearly 500,000 citizens even the most prudent
use of this device to obtain goods and services for themselves and their
families."' The inability of the emancipated minor, and particularly the
married minor, to enter into contracts is the major problem posed by the
application of ancient standards in the social and economic milieu of the
1960's. It would be desirable in solving this probler also to permit other
classes of minors to contract if they had both the need and the maturity
in fact to do so. It is necessary, also, that the law still provide protection
to the minor from unfair dealings.
In sum, while many, perhaps most, infants necd the ancient protection given them by the law, this protection seems r ,.ther an arbitrary restraint upon the large and growing class of emancipated infants who have
a definite need to enter into contracts. In addition, the law's protection
is doubtless unnecessary as regards some unemancipated infants, who may
well have the maturity necessary to decide for them ;elves the fairness of
contracts into which they wish to enter. Furthermore, to prevent possible future difficulties, the law of infants' contracts should relax its
simple, arbitrary doctrines to conform to present business practices by
allowing minors to enter into certain small transactions without a possibility of later disaffirmance.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Of course, the problem of the emancipated infant has not gone unrecognized; indeed, nine states have attempted by legislation to solve it by
prescribing eighteen years as the age of majority for married persons. 2
This solution has been attacked 3 on the partially valid ground that marriage does not automatically vest maturity in a per3on. Marriage does
not invest a person with wisdom or stability;4 it might even be argued
that a hasty, youthful marriage indicates a lack of maturity. But neither
is a person automatically invested with contractual acumen on his twentyfirst birthday. A more precise criticism of lowering the age of majority
for married persons is simply that it still bases full contractual capacity
solely on an arbitrary point in time. The selection of any age is arbitrary
in that it leaves to chance the individual minor's need to contract, his need
51.
52.

See note 41 supra, and text accompanying note 42 supra.
Those states are Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Oregon and Utah. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 34, § 76 (1958) ; CAL. Civ. CODE § 25 (1964
supp.) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.01 (males), § 743.03 (females) (1964) ; IDAHO CODE § 32101 (1963) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.1 (1959) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-101 (1964) ; MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 25-61 (1957) ; OREGON REv. STAT. §§ 109.510, 109 521 (1961) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953).

53. Note, 48 COLum. L. REv. 272, 276 (1948).

54. There is evidence, however, that the ability to maintan a successful marriage
SAUL, op. cit. supra note 27, at 7 and 125.

is an indication of maturity.
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of protection, and his background, training, experience, maturity, and
education.55 Lowering the age for married persons might solve some of
their contractual problems, but it does nothing to allow the vast majority
of infants to contract if they have the need and competence. Consequently, it is submitted that a better solution (even to the problems of the
married minor) can be found.
A suggestion as to the direction such a solution might take can be
gleaned from statutes in California 6 and New York"7 which provide that
either party to a contract for the employment of infants in the entertainment and professional athletic fields may submit the contract to a court
for approval. If the contract is found to be fair to the infant, it is declared binding and may not be disaffirmed."s While these statutes are
severely limited in the classes of infants and the classes of contracts which
come within their operation, they are useful as a guide for possible solutions to the broader problems this note has posed.
If broadened to include all infants' contracts, similar statutes could
provide the ultimate in protection to the infant from unfair contracts,
while at the same time protecting the adult from future disaffirmance by
the infant. A way would thus be open to the infant who needed a contract to obtain it with judicial approval. There are, however, certain
serious drawbacks in the extension of these statutes to all infants' contracts. For example, in many areas of the country, securing prior judicial approval of each contract into which the infant proposed to enter
would involve a long delay. This delay in itself could render the solution
impractical. Even worse, the necessity of obtaining separate judicial approval of each contract would be an expensive operation even if, as would
certainly be the case, resort to this method were limited to major contracts. Add to these objections the fear of chaotic overcrowding of court
calendars, and it is evident that few legislatures would pursue this course
toward solution of the problems under discussion.
A similar approach has been taken by eight states,55 which answers in
55. See note 34 supra.
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 36 (1964 Supp.).
57. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 3-105-3-108 (McKinney 1964).
58. The California statute was first enacted in 1927, and was amended in 1941 and
1947, reaching its present form in 1963. See note 56 supra. The New York statute (note
57 supra) is slightly more detailed and provides that no contract of over three years duration may be approved. If the minor is unmarried, and under eighteen years of age, par-

ental approval must be obtained. The statute also allows the court to revoke its approval
of the contract if this is required in the best interests of the minor. The revocation is

not, of course, retroactive.
59. CODE OF ALABAmA, Title 27, § 13-20 (1958), minors over 18; ARi. STAT. ANN.,
§ 34-2001 (1962), males over 18, females over 16; FLA. STAT. ANN., §§ 62.23 to 62.26
(1943); MIss. CODE, ch. 2, §§ 1264 to 1268 (1957) ; CoDE OF S.C., § 10-2562 (1962), lim-

ited to loans only;

TENN. CODE ANN.,

§§ 23-1201 to 23-1205 (1965 Supp.) ; TEXAS

C-WVI
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part the objections to an extension of the California and New York
statutes. Under these eight statutes, a minor or his parents may petition
a court to remove the disabilities of the minor to contract with no restrictions on the class of minor or the subject matter of the contract, except
that seven states set a minimum age at which the decree of removal of
disabilities may be granted.
Tennessee's statute is the most flexible and the most consistent with
the retention of a good measure of protection for the minor. It provides
that the chancellor may remove the disabilities of any minor over the age
of eighteen years" upon petition of that minor, after a hearing in which
the minor's parents are made defendants and at which any other relative
or friend of the minor may appear to contest the removal of disabilities.
The decree may remove disabilities generally or may remove them only
to permit the making of a particular contract. The decree, in short, may
impose any restrictions on removal as the chancellor "deems proper . . .
in the best interests of the minor." This type of statute is flexible, provides security for the adult contracting with a mincer who has taken advantage of its provisions, and gives the minor who needs it the ability to
enter into binding contracts. While there would be some expense, delay,
and crowding of court calendars, these disadvantages would occur only
once for each minor, not once for each contract of each minor.
The main objection that can be raised against such a statute is that it
does not furnish maximum protection for the minor; he could be duped
by an adult an hour after the hearing. Investigation by the court prior to
the issuance of a decree would minimize this possibility by increasing the
probability that the minor had the necessary maturity to contract. This
probability is only relative, however, and the objection cannot be completely refuted. Any solution to the problem raised by the present denial
of capacity will entail some compromise. Since t-,e law must consider
many interests which are often conflicting, 1 the solution arrived at must
be the best possible after balancing the interests involved. The Tennessee
statute generally appears to present, in theory, the best plan yet devised.
Apart from its theoretical usefulness, this type of statute seems to
work. The Tennessee statute, for example, either i' quite effective or is
used infrequently, because there are no reported cases under it although
it has been in effect since

1 9 1 5 .2

A similar statute in Texas 3 has been

tit. 96, Art. 5921 to 5923 (Vernon's 1962); WYoMJ:NG STAT. 1957, §§ 14-1 to
14-3 (1965 repl.), very similar to Texas.
60. See note 34 supra.
61. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
62. Much the same can be said of the Mississippi, Arkansas, and Alabama statutes,
the litigation under which has been mainly limited to jurisdictional questions. See e.g..
STAT. ANiT.,
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on the books since 1881. One case under this statute, Dallas State Land
Bank v. Dolan, 4 deseives detailed exposition because of the insight it
gives into the results possible under a poorly drafted statute of this type.
The case concerned an infant who took a one-quarter interest in certain land from his father's intestate estate. After the passage of some
time, his mother, who also had taken a fractional interest, remarried.
When the infant was eighteen, he made application for a removal of his
minority disabilities, in which application the step-father falsely swore
that the infant was nineteen years old, the minimum age at which such a
decree could be granted. The hearing on the application was held only
two days after the application was filed, and the decree was granted on
the same day as the hearing. Afterwards, the infant executed a deed of
gift of his interest to his mother. The case under discussion arose when
the infant attempted to claim his one-fourth interest against the Dallas
Land Bank, which had acquired title to the land. The infant claimed that
since he was under twenty-one years of age at the time of his deed to the
mother, he could disaffirm that deed and recover the property. He attacked the decree removing his disabilities on the ground of want of jurisdiction, as such jurisdiction was conferred only when the petitioning infant was over nineteen. In denying the minor recovery of his claimed
share, the Texas Supreme Court said the recital in the decree that the infant was nineteen years of age was conclusive of that fact and the decree
was immune to collateral attack. The court stated that while the statute
did not provide for investigation of the facts in the minor's application,"i
authority for such investigation was implied and was assumed to have
been made.
Regardless of the necessity of removal decrees being given protection in the interests of stability, there is evident in this case an inherent
defect in the statutes which provide for judicial removal of disabilities:
inadequate investigation by the court issuing the decree may result in the
law being used as a tool for judicially-approved overreaching of the infant
by an adult. While no statute can completely protect the infant or the
Hutchinson v. Till, 212 Ala. 64, 101 So. 676 (1924) ; Tays v. Johnson, 173 Ark. 223, 292
S.W. 122 (1927); Dubon v. Tolkes, 153 Miss. 91, 120 So. 437 (1929).
63. Note 59 supra.
64. 132 Tex. 198, 120 S.W.2d 798 (1938).

65. TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN., tit. 96, art. 5921 (1962) "Minors above the age of nineteen years, where it shall appear to their material advantage, may have their disabilities of
minority removed. . . ." Art. 5922: "The petition for such removal shall state the

grounds relied on, whether the parents of the minor are living or dead, and the name and

residence of each living parent. Such petition shall be sworn to by the father or mother
of said minor or by any other credible person cognizant of the facts, and shall be filed
with the District Court of the county where the minor resides, and a hearing had on any
day of any term of said court, or during a vacation of said court."
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court from fraud, the particular false information given in Dolan could
surely have been discovered with a minimum of effort. At least the
statute could provide for an investigation and also provide for a minimum time lapse between the application of the infant and the granting of
the decree.
Although the Dolan case illustrates a defect in the judicial removal
of disabilities statutes, one must weigh the possible abuse of the statutes
against the advantages they offer. On balance, th,. lack of abuses, evident in the dearth of reported cases, leads to the conclusion that this type
of statute, if carefully drafted and administered, has the potential of being an effective, workable, and useful tool in solving the problems presented by the blanket rule of disability now in effect in most states.
Another possible approach would be a statute establishing a presumption of the incapacity of infants, replacing the present rule of law that all
persons below twenty-one years are incapable of contracting. For example, such a statute could provide that all persons under the age of sixteen years are incapable of entering into a valid contract; such persons
could disaffirm any contract as they can under present law. However,
persons having attained their sixteenth birthday would be prima fade
presumed to lack capacity to enter into contracts, but the adult party to the
contract could overcome this presumption by evidence of capacity in fact.
An explanation of the selection of an age limit: of sixteen is appropriate. The compulsory education laws of many states fix sixteen years
as the minimum age at which a minor may leave school. 6 Thus, infants
under this age are generally living with parents and -,ttending high school:
they have little pressing need to contract in their own name. It is also
true that only an insignificant percentage below this age are married."
Furthermore, even if there were a need for minors under sixteen to contract, they arguably are so immature that the need would not outweigh
their lack of understanding, and therefore granting of even presumptive
capacity would do them more harm than good. Therefore, while this
note has argued elsewhere" against the establishment of any age in connection with capacity, it is believed that no harm will be done or serious
problems raised if the age of sixteen were set as an age below which no
contract could be binding on the minor.
After his sixteenth birthday the minor would, under the proposed
statute, be presumed incapable of contracting. This presumption could
be rebutted by the other party to the contract by offering evidence that
66. See, e.g., IND.

ANN. STAT. § 28-505 (Burns 1964 Supp.).
67. Only 12,958 males sixteen years of age were married in 1960; this is only .95
of the total. 1960 CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 28, part 1, page 1-442.
68. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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the minor was, in fact, capable. Such evidence could go to the possession
by the minor of superior reasoning power or outstanding intelligence, that
is, to personal qualities possessed by the minor. Evidence that the minor
is married or engaging in business as an adult may also tend to show contractual capacity. The statute could list several states of fact, which, if
proven to be present at the time of contracting, would conclusively rebut
the presumption of incapacity-for example, marriage.
The proposed statute's weaknesses are apparent, the most serious being that it would probably solve nothing. The adult party to a contract
with an infant would be in no better position than he is today except that
he could submit the issue of the infant's capacity to a jury. The infant
would likely have just as much difficulty finding an adult to contract
with him as he now has, because no adult would want to invite litigation
even if he had more than an even chance of winning. If the statute included a state of facts which would rebut the presumption of incapacity
(marriage, for example), the minor would be deprived of any protection
from an overreaching adult; the statute would in effect only be reducing
the age of majority for persons who fell within the enumerated states of
fact. The shortcomings of such inflexibility have already been discussed.68 Since the purpose of the changes under discussion is to permit
the making of prudent contracts by those minors who need the capacity
to contract or those who have the maturity necessary to exercise it intelligently, the proposed presumption rule would seem to fail in being able
to accomplish its primary goal."0
On the positive side, the presumption approach provides two major
advantages over any solution discussed previously. First, there is no
necessity of prior judicial approval of contracts. If the infant is in fact
competent to contract, or if he falls within the list of classes which rebut
the presumption of incapacity, he is bound on his contracts. This is an
advantage to the minor since it obviates the necessary delay and expense
involved in obtaining either removal of disabilities or approval of a specific contract. The statute could allow the court to invalidate any unfair
contracts sought to be enforced by the adult, if the minor would other69. See note 52 snpra and accompanying text.
70. While the textual proposal suggested the presumption run in favor of incapacity,
it would be possible to eliminate some of the objections discussed if the presumption were
made to run in favor of the capacity of the minor. While this would reduce the risk involved for the adult, there would still be left the possibility of the minor overcoming the
presumption at trial. More serious is the fact that letting the presumption run in favor
of capacity would practically eliminate the protection which should be provided the minor
against overreaching; since the point of any solution is to provide a method whereby exceptional minors can contract while still giving most minors protection of the law, the reversal of the presumption from that outlined in the text would be wholly unsatisfactory
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wise be bound under the statute. This would provide even more protection for the infant. Secondly, the proposed solution gives a flexibility
unmatched by any discussed previously. If litigation ensued, the best interests of the minor would be examined in the light of the specific contract made; thus the court would not be working in a limbo of uncertainty as it tends to be under the judicial removal of disabilities statutes.
At the same time, if the contract were fair, the statute would provide absolute removal of disabilities for those minors who need it most, while
providing protection for other minors in the form of a rebuttable presumption against capacity. This same presumption would furnish a
measure of protection for the adult who deals with an exceptionally mature minor who did not fall within the specified classes.
Any prediction as to the effectiveness of the presumption proposal
is pure speculation, for no jurisdiction has adopted it. That the tort and
criminal law rules of presumption apparently work' does not permit a
projection of the workability of similar rules in the law of contract.
These areas of law cannot really be compared because in the former the
rules deal with capacity to form intent or to commit a negligent act whereas in the latter they would deal with capacity to understand the ramifications of a commercial bargain, and because in the former, one is dealing
with a contact between litigants that at least one of them did not seek,
while in the latter with a voluntary contact, a "meeing of the minds."
The best estimate that may be made as to the success of the presumption
rules applied to contract is that of all the suggestions discussed in this
note, they would be the most difficult to administer with certainty and
the least likely to result in any appreciable change in the effects of the
present law of infants' contracts. However, the presumption-statute suggestion is presented in the hope that further thinking will be stimulated
in this area.
To summarize, of the solutions to the problems raised by the present
law of infants' contracts, the New York and California statutes, providing for judicial approval of individual contracts, while efficient for the
limited class of personal service contracts they cover (i.e., actors and
athletes), do not solve problems in any other contract area. An extension
of these approval statutes to cover all types of contracts would be expensive and burdensome for both the courts and for the infants requesting
approval. The Tennessee-type statute providing for removal of infants'
71. That they apparently work does not mean that they are highly regarded. Indeed
Prosser is very critical of these presumptions in the area of torts, saying they are arbitrary, and intimating that the ages involved are founded only on superstitious use of the
magic number seven. PRossm, LAW oF ToRTs 158 (3d ed. 1964).
72. See note 5 supra.
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disabilities, on the other hand, is satisfactory for the infant who desires
to conclude a number of contracts, but may pose practical difficulties to
the minor who only desires one contract which is not worth the expense
involved in obtaining the removal decree. Also, any removal of disabilities prior to entering a contract could result in later overreaching of
the minor unless provision were made in the statute to prevent this. The
suggested solution of changing the present rule of law against capacity
into a rebuttable presumption would overcome both the objection to the
costs involved in the other solutions and the crowding of court calendars
in the approval-type statute; however, it would be the least likely to result
in any practical change in the problems of the infant who needs to contract. The attitudes of merchants and other adults would not likely be
changed by the uncertainty of contract enforcement inherent in such a
solution.

